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Abstract 
Throughout the Great War, the Netherlands tried frantically to remain a neutral nation between the warring 
Central Powers and the Entente Forces. Notwithstanding its neutrality, the war left distinct marks on Dutch 
society and economy. This article argues that it also left marks, both temporary and lasting, on Dutch contract 
law. Never since the introduction of the Dutch Civil Code in 1838 had the Netherlands been exposed to such a 
disruptive international conflict as the Great War. Therefore, the war presented the first systemic test of Civil 
Code doctrines such as impossibility and force majeure. As far as these doctrines are concerned, some have 
argued that the Great War was no different from other, less disruptive economic events. However, on closer 
inspection one may find that the application of private law doctrines under war conditions seemed to reflect 
the Dutch neutrality doctrine. The courts strictly construed and enforced contracts, mostly rejected defences 
involving ‘impossibility’ and vis maior, and often held that contracting parties had knowingly assumed the risks 
associated with contracting during a war. Moreover, the Great War marked the end of nineteenth-century 
laissez-faire notions in regulatory policies, which in turn caused a gradual shift in balance between public law 
and freedom of contract. In hindsight, the War can also be regarded as the turning point in Dutch doctrinal 
thinking on the respective roles of and the relationship between force majeure, unforeseen circumstances and 
good faith. Another way of looking at judicial application of contract law during the Great War is to consider 
this as an extension of the Dutch neutrality doctrine. Both viewpoints are explored in this article.  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the Great War, the Kingdom of the Netherlands tried frantically to maintain a 
position of armed neutrality between the Central Powers and the Entente Forces.1 While it 
more or less succeeded in doing so, unsurprisingly the war did leave distinct marks on Dutch 
society and economy. These marks eventually translated into legal change. Therefore, in 
hindsight, the impact of the Great War on Dutch law and regulation was enduring and 
lasting, even though this was not always appreciated at the time.  
                                                 
1
 On the Dutch neutrality doctrine see eg C Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog—deel 2 1914–1917 
(Wolters-Noordhoff, 1972) 12 ff; EH Kossmann, The Low Countries 1780–1940 (Clarendon Press, 1978) 546 ff; P 
Moeyes, Buiten Schot: Nederland tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog (Arbeiderspers, 2001) 27 ff; MM Abbenhuis, 
The Art of Staying Neutral: The Netherlands in the First World War, 1914–1918 (Amsterdam University Press, 
2006) 23 ff; I Tames, Oorlog voor onze gedachten: Oorlog, neutraliteit en identiteit in het Nederlandse publieke 
debat 1914–1918 (diss A’dam) (Verloren, 2006) 14 ff; S Kruizinga, Overlegeconomie in oorlogstijd: De 
Nederlandsche Overzee Trustmaatschappij en de Eerste Wereldoorlog (Walburg Pers, 2012) 16. 
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In this contribution, I provide a partial analysis of that impact. I do so by first briefly 
discussing the impact of the war on Dutch society and economy and explaining the peculiar 
role that its private law system played in keeping Dutch international trade afloat (section II). 
The discussion serves to sketch the background against which we should understand the 
development of two key contract law doctrines—impossibility and force majeure (vis 
maior)—in Dutch case law and academic legal debate (section III). Next, we turn to the 
influence of the Great War on the slow and gradual development of the good faith principle 
and the doctrine of unforeseen circumstances in Dutch law (section IV). Finally, Dutch 
contract law is considered in terms of its contribution to the Dutch neutrality doctrine during 
the Great War (section IV).  
2 THE GREAT WAR AND DUTCH SOCIETY & ECONOMY 
At the beginning of the war it was clear that the Dutch government was ill prepared for the 
economic consequences of an outbreak of hostilities between so many countries. There was 
no robust legal framework for dealing with the immediate problems caused by the outbreak 
of war.2 These problems included a sudden decline in trust in bank institutions, a run on 
banks, and hoarding of coinage.3 The disruption of the finance system, leaving investors 
facing acute liquidity problems, led to the hurried closure of the Amsterdam stock 
exchange.4 At the same time, the sudden interruption in the importation of essential 
foodstuffs, and the distributional issues these shortages led to, created new problems for 
supplying the market.5 These problems were unparalleled in scale and as such prompted the 
introduction of interventionist emergency legislation at odds with the economic laissez-faire 
policies that had been predominant until then. So, as in other countries,6 the war heralded 
the end of laissez-faire economic policies and the start of more intense regulation of certain 
                                                 
2
 AH Flierman, ‘Het centrale punt in de reederswereld’: De Koninklijke Nederlandse Redersvereniging, 1905–
1980 (diss Leiden) (De Boer Maritiem, 1984) 43 ff. 
3
 G Vissering and J Westerman Holstijn, ‘The Effect of the War upon Banking and Currency’ in HWC Bordewijk, 
G Vissering and J Westerman Holstijn (eds), The Netherlands and the World War: Studies in the War History of a 
Neutral, vol 4 (Economic and Social History of the World War—Netherlands Series, Yale University Press for the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1928) 4; J van der Flier, War Finances in the Netherlands up to 
1918 (Economic and Social History of the World War—Dutch Series, Clarendon Press for the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1923) 21. Interestingly, the sudden demise of public trust in banking 
institutions caused strikingly similar problems on the London markets (though obviously on a larger scale). Cf R 
Roberts, Saving the City: The Great Financial Crisis of 1914 (Oxford University Press, 2013) 3 ff. 
4
 On the so-called ‘prolongation’ system of financing stock market investments and the abrupt liquidity 
problems it caused in July 1914, see eg Vissering and Westerman Holstijn (n 3) 5 ff, 80; F de Roos, De algemene 
banken in Nederland (Oosthoek, 1949) 90 ff; Kruizinga (n 1) 18. The acute problems in banking and stock trade 
were similar to those experienced elsewhere; see Roberts (n 3).  
5
 Moeyes (n 1) 274.  
6
 Cf R Overy, The Morbid Age: Britain and the Crisis of Civilization, 1919–1939 (Penguin, 2010) 50 ff; H Dörner, 
‘Erster Weltkrieg und Privatrecht’ (1986) 17 Rechtstheorie 385, 397 ff. 
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markets such as food production, financial services and housing.7 Apart from emergency 
legislation on banking, currency, insurance and stock trade, a long list of new and lasting 
market legislation was introduced between 1914 and 1919. The Foodstuffs Act 
(Levensmiddelenwet 1914) and the Distribution Act (Distributiewet 1916) regulated 
production, supply, pricing and distribution of certain essential goods.8 New powers 
introduced in 1914 under the Expropriation Act (Onteigeningswet 1851) authorised the 
government to requisition goods.9 Several Acts concerning the protection of tenants were 
introduced to protect against termination at will and to fix prices in order to stabilise the 
nervous housing market.10 And, to top it all, the revolutionary ghost that haunted Europe 
sped up the introduction of universal suffrage (in 1917 for men and in 1919 for women).  
In September 1914, four eminent businessmen took the initiative of setting up a committee 
of trading companies, banks and shipping companies to deal with trade problems caused by 
the British authorities. The British fleet effectively controlled sea access to Dutch harbours. 
The British authorities demanded assurances that conditional contraband such as Dutch-
Indies tobacco and foodstuffs en route to the Netherlands would not be exported from the 
Netherlands to any of the Central Power countries and were destined for home consumption 
only. The dilemma for the Dutch government was that it did not want to be seen as agreeing 
to terms dictated by either of the belligerents, but it had to reckon with duties to Germany 
under the 1868 Convention for Navigation on the Rhine (the Mannheim Document) and it 
wanted to keep the Dutch and colonial trade economy afloat as much as possible.11 At first, 
the government decided not to openly assume any obligations vis-à-vis the British.12 Instead, 
it relied on the private initiative of the four businessmen, who duly incorporated their 
initiative as the NV Nederlandsche Overzee Trustmaatschappij (NOT), the Netherlands 
Overseas Trust Company.13  
The NOT worked on the contract principle that shipping and import companies voluntarily 
subscribed to the NOT scheme and that by doing so they assured that any imports of 
conditional contraband into the Netherlands would either remain in the Netherlands or 
                                                 
7
 Cf P De Rooy, Republiek van rivaliteiten: Nederland sinds 1813 (Wereldbibliotheek, 5th edn 2014) 142, who 
refers to this development as the ‘entwinement of markets and politics’. 
8
 Government subsidies were also distributed, especially to sustain the building industry; see HWC Bordewijk, 
‘War Finances in the Netherlands, 1918–1922: the Costs of War’ in Bordewijk et al (n 3) 153. 
9
 M Kraaijestein, ‘Lokale noden en lokaal beleid’ in H Binneveld (ed), Leven naast de catastrofe: Nederland 
tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog (Verloren, 2001) 64 ff. 
10
 HJ Romeyn, ‘The Housing Problem’ in CJP Zaalberg et al (eds), The Netherlands and the World War: Studies in 
the War History of a Neutral, vol 2 (Economic and Social History of the World War—Netherlands Series, Yale 
University Press for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1928) 181 ff. 
11
 Smit (n 1) 69 ff; cf Kossmann (n 1) 545 ff.  
12
 Kruizinga (n 1) 49 ff. 
13
 The NOT was a not-for-profit organisation; any profits the NOT made were donated to the War Relief Fund 
and the State. Note, however, that the NOT Board members’ main occupation was with commercial companies 
that undoubtedly benefited from the war conditions and their key position within the Dutch war trade 
framework. See Kruizinga (n 1) 105. 
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were exported only to  neutral third countries. Thus, shipments to the Netherlands were 
subject to a NOT import consent. The legal status of such undertakings (‘consents’ in Dutch) 
was hybrid: officially, the NOT was a mere private actor which operated on the basis of 
contract, but in the international war theatre NOT consents were ascribed the status of safe 
passage documentation.14  
Based on this voluntary arrangement, shipping and/or import companies that underwrote 
and then breached the NOT rules would be fined heavily and blacklisted. Those traders that 
refused to follow the NOT rules were not as such criminally liable15 under Dutch law, but 
their goods did run the risk of being stopped and confiscated by the British admiralty, and 
once harboured in the Netherlands they were effectively excluded from access to goods and 
services as a result of the high degree of commitment of Dutch traders and businesses.  
The contractual basis made the arrangement slightly more palatable for the companies 
involved, and it was rather successful in the first two years of the war, although admittedly 
there was also a thriving semi-legal and illegal export trade of goods to the German 
hinterland. The Germans obviously saw through the smoke and mirrors of a private 
organisation executing the implicit Dutch government policies on an English leash. They 
reasoned, however, that any importation into the Netherlands was to be preferred over no 
importation at all, since goods on Dutch soil could still somehow find their way to German 
buyers. Thus, neutrality of the Netherlands was in keeping with the German strategy of 
having the Rotterdam harbour as a Luftröhre (windpipe) for the German economy.16  
The voluntary basis of compliance with the NOT rules caused civil courts some headaches at 
a later stage of the war. Since the NOT was not an official part of government and their 
framework of fining and blacklisting was not based on statutory powers, how could NOT 
actions and decisions affect the contractual relationships between sellers and buyers? NOT 
rules which rendered performance of contracts factually impossible were obviously not 
equal to legal impossibility. Some courts did however hold that a debtor giving priority to 
NOT rules instead of his duties under the contract could be excused in view of the 
reputational risks and the risk of ostracism he would run.17 
                                                 
14
 On the contractual nature of the NOT framework see eg Kruizinga (n 1) 107 ff. Cf Rechtbank Amsterdam 8 
June 1917, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (NJ; Dutch Court Cases Digest) 1917, 807 (Handelsvennootschap onder 
firma Behrendt & Bodenheimer v Handelsvennootschap onder firma Gebrs. Sickesz); Rechtbank Rotterdam, 17 
January 1918, NJ 1919, 306 (NV Firma M Cohn v Nolet).  
15
 Cf Rechtbank Rotterdam, 17 November 1916, NJ 1918, 1025 (Vignati v Schepens). 
16
 Moeyes (n 1) 192; Abbenhuis (n 1) 185; De Rooy (n 7) 138; N Ferguson, The Pity of War (Penguin, 1999) 97.  
17
 eg Rechtbank (ie Court of First Instance) Amsterdam, 26 May 1916, NJ 1917, 361 (Handelsvennootschap 
onder de firma Wood & Co v NV Curaçaosche Handelmaatschappij); Rechtbank Rotterdam, 10 January 1917, NJ 
1917, 658 (Polak v Handelsvennootschap onder firma H Jacobs); Gerechtshof (ie, Court of Appeal, also referred 
to as ‘Hof’) Den Haag, 12 May 1919, Weekblad van het Recht (W) 1920, no 105923, 4 (Bakker v 
Handelsvennootschap onder Firma Behrendt en Bodenheimer, NV Maatschappij tot Exploitatie van Rademakers 
Koninklijke Cacao- en Chocolade fabrieken). 
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In the long run, the voluntary basis of the NOT proved inadequate. Conditions for 
international trade and commercial shipping deteriorated rapidly. Although at the start of 
the war it seemed that the British would adhere to the 1909 London Declaration, practice 
proved to be less principled.18 The British listing of absolute and conditional contraband 
changed frequently, necessitating continuous (re)negotiation of import and export terms by 
the NOT and the Dutch government with British and German representatives.19 This put the 
NOT and the Dutch government in a state of incessant uncertainty. On the one hand there 
was the British government’s total naval blockade, which mean that it effectively ruled the 
North Sea waves and could therefore extract almost any deal from the Netherlands, 
provided it did not overtly overstep the magical boundaries of international diplomacy and 
thus risk the Netherlands openly siding with the Germans. On the other there were the 
Germans, whose ‘Hinterland’ was hugely important for the exportation of Dutch agricultural 
produce and industrial products and who were keen to ensure that Dutch neutrality was 
observed in both directions so that it too could profit from what few goods could be passed 
on.20  
Moreover, the Netherlands, having few domestic mineral resources such as coal and iron 
ore, was greatly reliant on both overseas and overland import of such raw materials. The 
Netherlands also depended on trade with the Dutch Indies colonies (for items such as coffee 
and tobacco), and so it tried hard to minimise the disruptive effects of the naval blockade on 
the flow of goods where and when it could. That said, being a country with an open 
economy, remaining neutral in a global war amidst the main protagonists hardly offers any 
guarantees of escaping unscathed; the intensity of the German submarine warfare strategy 
and the Allied strategy of suffocating the German economy inevitably caused collateral 
damage to neutrals such as the Netherlands.21 Shortages of most materials meant that 
prices shot up, provided they were still available. The ongoing war caught the NOT in an 
increasingly incoherent web of a private regulatory scheme which overlapped with growing 
state intervention of import and export licenses, bans and restrictions. While the NOT 
                                                 
18
 Moeyes (n 1) 181 ff; C Smit, Tien studiën betreffende Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog (HD Tjeenk Willink, 
1975) 80 ff; Kruizinga (n 1) 25 ff. It seems that David Lloyd George presaged this British dilemma; see Ferguson 
(n 16) 66. 
19
 eg JG Hoogendijk, De Nederlandsche Koopvaardij in den Oorlogstijd (1914–1918) (Van Holkema & Warendorf, 
1930) 19 ff.  
20
 On the economic ties between Germany and the Netherlands in this era, see eg H de Jong, ‘Between the 
Devil and The Deep Blue Sea: The Dutch Economy during World War I’ in S Broadberry and M Harrison (eds), 
The Economics of World War I (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 137 ff; HAM Klemann, ‘Wirtschaftliche 
Verflechtung im Schatten zweier Kriege 1914–1940’ in HAM Klemann and F Wielenga (eds), Deutschland und 
die Niederlande: Wirtschaftsbeziehungen im 19 und 20 Jahrhundert (Waxmann, 2009) 19; Kruizinga (n 1) 22 ff.  
21
 Abbenhuis (n 1) 117 ff. Dutch neutrality was further jeopardised by the 1917 USA export ban on neutrals and 
ultimately effectively violated by the 1918 requisitioning by the Allied forces of the Dutch commercial fleet, 
which was the ultimate blow to the Dutch neutrality doctrine. Cf Hoogendijk (n 19) 34. 
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provided a convenient façade in the first years of the war, it gradually became an odd 
marriage of (in)convenience for businessmen and policymakers.  
For some Dutch traders, the war economy opened up opportunities for profiteering and 
abuse of war conditions.22 The lower classes, which did not directly profit and in fact saw 
both the cost of living and unemployment figures rise steadily during the War,23 increasingly 
voiced their discontent through demonstrations, looting and so-called ‘war food riots’, which 
were seemingly prompted more by discontent and a perceived growth of inequality than by 
genuine starvation.24 The timely introduction of general suffrage, social reform and the 
relative popularity of the House of Orange contributed to averting a 1918 self-proclaimed 
socialist revolution from taking root.  
This brief introduction to the effects of the Great War on Dutch society and economy serves 
as a stepping stone towards the subject of this paper: the influence of the Great War on 
Dutch contract law. Given the radical changes to economic conditions brought about by the 
war, the period under review saw extensive repudiation and renegotiation of sales and 
services contracts which led to a substantial amount of litigation, raising important doctrinal 
questions involving issues of performance, rescission and damages.  
3 BREACH, IMPOSSIBILITY AND FORCE MAJEURE 
General Introduction 
At the time of the Great War, the 1838 Dutch Civil Code (DCC) was in force. This code was by 
and large a continuation of the 1804 Code Napoleon, which had been in force in the Dutch 
territories since the French annexation of the Netherlands in 1810. The Code distinguished 
between culpable and non-culpable non-performance—that is, between actionable breach 
                                                 
22
 On war profits, see Moeyes (n 1) 328, 379 ff; Kruizinga (n 1) 113 ff, 167, 249, 313; Van der Flier (n 3) 101 ff. 
See also Vissering and Westerman Holstijn (n 3) 21, who argue that the Netherlands became a ‘creditor nation’ 
as a result of the war. For instance, loans to the German Reich in exchange for coal supplies sold by the 
Germans and as vendor’s credit for purchases by the Germans under of the 1916 Hindenburg Program, 
combined with the continued devaluation of the Reichsmark against the Dutch guilder, yielded substantial 
financial gains for the Dutch. Cf Kruizinga (n 1) 261 ff; H Strachan, Financing the First World War (Oxford 
University Press, 2004) 166; D Stevenson, With our Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918 (Penguin, 
2012) 421; A Gaaff, Financiering van de Eerste Wereldoorlog: Vier jaar vechten op krediet (Uitgeverij Aspekt, 
2014). On balance, the Dutch economy suffered less than others: see De Jong (n 20) 137 ff; H-P Ullmann, 
‘Finance’ in J Winter (ed), The Cambridge History of the First World War, vol 2: The State (Cambridge University 
Press, 2014) 428; E Damsgaard Hansen, European Economic History: From Mercantilism to Maastricht and 
Beyond (CBS Press, 2012) 226. 
23
 On 1914–19 unemployment figures see eg De Jong (n 20) 137 ff; Van der Flier (n 3) 107 ff.  
24
 J Visser and M Visser, ‘Profijt en protest: Verscherping der sociale tegenstellingen in Nederland gedurende de 
Eerste Wereldoorlog’ in H Binneveld (ed), Leven naast de catastrofe: Nederland tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog 
(Verloren, 2001) 103–4. Note, however, that the American export ban and requisitioning of the Dutch 
commercial fleet in 1917–18 did cause significant supply problems for the Netherlands; see Ferguson (n 16) 
253.  
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and impossibility due to vis maior. Breach of contract authorised the creditor to petition the 
court for rescission ab initio.25 In practice, parties could insert a termination clause in their 
contract to allow for unilateral termination without court involvement in case of breach. 
Furthermore, breach implied culpability and that in itself offered the basis for a cause of 
action for damages. By contrast, vis maior of one party ended the contract and discharged 
both parties from any duty to perform.26  
According to Articles 1280–1 DCC, the debtor (which is the generic term used to denote the 
party who is under a duty to perform any obligation, be it to deliver or to pay an amount in 
money etc) was liable to pay damages in case of non-performance unless he could prove 
‘toeval’, ‘vreemde oorzaak’ or ‘overmagt’.27 These exceptions all denoted the same concept 
of vis maior, a non-culpable externality for which the debtor does not bear responsibility 
(neither for reasons of culpability nor for reasons of risk assumption). Thus, liability for 
breach of contract by non-performance was predicated on a presumed fault of the debtor. If 
he could disprove fault and thus establish vis maior, liability did not attach.28 
Furthermore, where the debtor was under a duty to deliver a particular object, as in a sales 
contract, the concept of ‘impossibility’ came into play. According to Article 1480 DCC (= 
Article 1302 Code Napoleon), an obligation to deliver an identifiable object was considered 
extinguished if the object perished due to a non-culpable cause. Thus, Article 1480 DCC 
contained a doctrine of impossibility: if it was impossible to deliver due to vis maior, the 
obligation to deliver ceased as well and the debtor was released from any duty to pay 
damages as much as the other party was released from paying the agreed sum.29  
So, in contract law, the concepts of impossibility (to deliver) and vis maior enshrined in 
Articles 1280 and 1480 DCC were more or less entwined: if performance was impossible due 
to a cause for which the debtor bore no responsibility, the contract was discharged without 
further amendment or variation. If, however, performance was perfectly possible, there was 
no impossibility and therefore no vis maior. Therefore, in court cases as well as in scholarly 
debates, the emphasis tended to be on what constituted impossibility rather than on what 
were the limits of culpability or imputability of risk. As a consequence, these two elements 
                                                 
25
 Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Supreme Court of the Netherlands; abbrev HR), 25 February 1916, W 1916 no 
10022 (Loeb v Mulderije). 
26
 Rechtbank Rotterdam, 15 January 1914, NJ 1914, 325 (Wipmuller v NV Hollandsche Aanneming 
Maatschappij).  
27
 Arts 1280–1 DCC were based on Arts 1147–8 Code Napoleon (‘cause étrangère’, ‘force majeure’, ‘cas fortuit’). 
From the 19th and early 20th centuries onwards, Dutch contract law doctrine held that there was no 
substantive difference between ‘cause étrangère’, ‘force majeure’ and ‘cas fortuit’. For references, see LEH 
Rutten, Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlandsch Burgerlijk Recht—Derde deel—
Verbintenissenrecht—Eerst stuk—De verbintenis (WEJ Tjeenk Willink, 3rd edn 1967) 248. 
28
 HR, 20 June 1919, NJ 1919, 811 (NV Haagsche Tramweg Maatschappij v Kuys). 
29
 HR, 7 May 1925, NJ 1925, 997 (Baumwollspinnerei Kolbermoor v Van Kempen qq). Cf Rechtbank Amsterdam, 
23 June 1920, NJ 1921, 1160 (Comm Handelsvennootschap o/d firma Textielhuis ‘Nederland’ v 
Handelsvennootschap o/d firma Amsterdamsche Confectiefabriek R Doyes & Co). 
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were often blurred into one wider test of contract risk allocation predicated on 
impossibility.30  
Non-Culpable Impossibility in War Cases 
The Great War was the first major systemic test of the Civil Code provisions on contract risk 
allocation. It was the first global armed conflict of substance in which the Netherlands had 
been involved since the proclamation of the Kingdom in 1815. Obviously, there had been 
multiple international conflicts which had had some impact on the Netherlands (such as the 
1830 secession of Belgium, the 1870–71 Franco-Prussian War and several colonial conflicts), 
but none of these were of the disruptive nature and scale of the Great War. Therefore, it is 
relevant to analyse the judicial application in war-related cases of such doctrines as breach 
of contract, impossibility and vis maior.  
In court proceedings, the facts underpinning the vis maior defence needed to be stated and, 
if contested, proved by the debtor.31 He was to prove that the obstruction to performance 
existed at the time the contractual obligation was due (neither earlier nor later).32 As we 
shall see, in war cases evidence of vis maior was far from easy to bring. The mere fact of the 
outbreak of war was clearly insufficient. Moreover, the war in itself did not render existing 
contracts illegal since restrictions on trading with belligerents were (at first) absent.33 Among 
the most successful vis maior defences were cases involving lack of cargo capacity to ship 
the goods,34 governments requisitioning goods,35 and transport and export restrictions 
rendering delivery impossible.36 
All in all, the number of court cases where the debtor was excused for non-performance was 
greatly outnumbered by the number of cases where the debtor was held liable for breach. 
The defendant had to prove that he had done everything reasonably possible to honour his 
                                                 
30
 For an overview of this development, see Rutten (n 27) 247 ff. 
31
 eg Rechtbank Amsterdam, 4 April 1919, W 1920, no 10580, 4 (J van Heijningen v NV Weduwe IT Numan’s 
Blikfabrieken) partially confirmed by Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 11 November 1921, W 1922 no 10833, 1; 
Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 27 October 1920, Weekblad voor Privaatrecht, Notariaat en Registratie (WPNR) 1922, 
no 2715, 4.  
32
 HR, 22 March 1918, W 1918, no 10265, NJ 1918, 481 (NV Wessanen’s Koninklijke Fabrieken v Suijling 
broodfabrikant); on appeal from Gerechtshof ’s-Hertogenbosch, 3 April 1917, NJ 1917, 591, WPNR 1918, no 
2512, 87. 
33
 Gerechtshof Den Bosch, 13 November 1917, NJ 1918, 405 (Neles v De Voghel); Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 14 
February 1923, W 1923, no 11088, 3 , NJ 1924, 212 (Polet v Firma E Gilmant & Cie (Soignies, Belgium)). 
34
 Rechtbank Rotterdam, 28 October 1915, NJ 1916, 423 (Handelsvennootschap onder firma Henri J Hool v 
Handelsvennootschap onder firm Friede Knurr). 
35
 Gerechtshof Den Haag, 4 December 1916, NJ 1917, 278 (Firma JN van der Reijden v Van den Oord). 
36
 Rechtbank Leeuwarden, 21 October 1920, NJ 1921, 145 (Firma Gebr Woudstra v Okkinga); Rechtbank 
Utrecht, 26 June 1918, WPNR 1918, no 2547, 473 (Société Anonyme Pégase v Utrechtsche Machinefabriek v/h 
Smulders & Co). 
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contractual obligations.37 So, if for instance the debtor argued that government restrictions 
had been imposed (on transport, export, production, etc), he should also bring evidence that 
he had applied for a concession and had done so in a timely and diligent fashion, since 
disproving fault implied bringing evidence of utmost diligence.38  
War cases show that the courts were generally reticent to sustain the debtor’s defence of 
impossibility.39 Debtors encountered sceptical courts.40 For instance, a supplier of English 
coal who argued impossibility was rebuked by the court since all sorts of coal were exported 
all the time from England to Holland.41 It seems that debtors had acquired a dubious 
reputation in the early days of the war by seemingly attempting to shirk their existing 
responsibilities as the outbreak of war opened up opportunities to make more profit under 
new contracts. For instance, when the government imposed a price ceiling for the sale of 
wheat flour, some sellers who had already entered into contracts with prices negotiated at a 
lower amount were keen to argue that the imposed tariffs constituted both a minimum price 
as well as a ceiling and that delivery at the original price was thus impossible.42 In response, 
it was argued by some scholars that debtors should not be easily let off the hook. Instead, 
these scholars posited, ‘faced with great disasters, great endeavours shall be expected from 
debtors’,43 and extraordinary price hikes should not exonerate debtors from performance.44 
                                                 
37
 Rechtbank Amsterdam, 12 November 1915, NJ 1916, 427 (Handelsvennootschap onder firma Van Zweeden 
en Co v NVM Witsenburg Jr’s Agentuur en Commissiehandel), confirmed by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal 
(Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 6 October 1916, NJ 1917, 275); Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 23 January 1920, NJ 1920, 
396 (NH onder firma Van Wessem & Co te Zaandam v HV onder firma Spliethoff Hass & Co Te Amsterdam). 
38
 eg Rechtbank Breda, 14 January 1919, NJ 1919, 382 (Hout- en Grond-Exploitatie-Maatschappij ‘Arbor’ v 
Daems); Rechtbank Rotterdam 11 June 1919, W 1920 no 10509, 2 (Jensen v NV van Steen’s Rijnreederij); 
Rechtbank Den Bosch, 30 April 1920, W 1921, no 10703, 4 (Klerx v Waisvisz). 
39
 JLL Wery, Overmacht bij overeenkomsten (Akad Prft Leiden) (Kruyt, 1919) 132; P Abas, Beperkende werking 
van de goede trouw (Kluwer, 1972) 110. 
40
 Arbitration panel Van der Horst, Wollring, Boekenoogen, 14 October 1914, WPNR 1914, no 2341, 509 
(Offermeier v Handelsvennootschap onder firma H Gerritsen); Rechtbank Utrecht, 15 December 1915, WPNR 
1916, no 2448, 572; Rechtbank Rotterdam, 8 December 1915, NJ 1916, 435 (NV Magnesitfabrieken voorheen 
Rosenboom en Co v NV Magnesiet Exploitatie Maatschappij); Rechtbank Utrecht, 12 January 1916, NJ 1916, 
1056 (Hesp v NV Jutphaasche Olie slagerij); Rechtbank Alkmaar, 15 November 1917, NJ 1918, 485 (NV Turness’ 
Scheepvaart en Agentuur Maatschappij v Burgemeester Houwing qq); Rechtbank Amsterdam, 13 March 1918, 
NJ 1918, 854 (Festin v Handelsvennootschap onder firma Drukker, Vigeveno & Co); Rechtbank Alkmaar, 23 May 
1918, NJ 1919, 19 (Crucq v NV Landbouwkantoor Noord-Holland); Gerechtshof Arnhem, 28 March 1923, NJ 
1924, 170 (Schut v Kempeneers).  
41
 Rechtbank Rotterdam, 5 October 1916, NJ 1918, 1030 (Coöperatieve Veevoederfabriek en Olieslagerij ‘De 
Boerenbond’ v Handelsvennootschap onder firma Jos de Poorter). 
42
 Rechtbank Haarlem, 20 October 1914, WPNR 1914, no 2341, 507 (Flink v NV Koninklijke Fabrieken voorheen 
Wessanen en Laan), upheld on appeal by Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 12 March 1915; Rechtbank Amsterdam, 4 
December 1914, WPNR 1915, no 2351, 32 (Bakery Marcelis v Wicherlink); HR, 25 June 1915, WPNR 1915, no 
2388, 497 finally settled the argument by holding that the new statutory powers of local authorities to 
requisition in fact implied impossibility to perform. 
43
 P Scholten, ‘Het recht tegenover de huidige crisis: Overmacht bij leveringscontracten’ [1914] Weeklad voor 
Privaatrecht, Notariaat en Registratie (WPNR) 417, 418. 
44
 WLPA Molengraaff, De gevolgen van den oorlog op handelsovereenkomsten, in het bijzonder op 
leveringscontracten (A Oosthoek, 1915) 16. 
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Judging by the fact that in most court cases the debtor was not excused for breaching his 
obligations, it seems that these calls resonated strongly with the judiciary. 
A further issue was the construction of contractual obligations. Courts were mostly unwilling 
to read more debtor-friendly terms into contracts than debtors themselves had negotiated 
into them. For instance, in a 1917 contract for the delivery of ‘Belgian oak’ casks, the subject 
matter was deemed only to identify the provenance of the casks, not their location at the 
time of sale. So, the seller was not allowed to argue impossibility if he intended to import 
the casks from Belgium, where such import had become impossible.45 Whenever a contract 
was considered to be one for generic goods, the debtor could not easily be excused for non-
performance (genus non perit).46 Likewise, if a seller promised to take care of transport but 
did not specify the means, he could not be excused if the mode of transport he 
contemplated was no longer available but others still were.47 
Once the war conditions had become part of daily life, contracting parties were expected to 
guard their interests by not promising more than they could deliver. For instance, in Keller v 
Oosterveld & Romijn, an English buyer entered into a contract for the delivery of ‘Prussian 
blue’ (a paint dye) by a Dutch seller in December 1914. The goods were to be delivered to 
the buyer in Amsterdam in early 1915, with a warranty of ‘neutral origin’ so that the buyer 
could export the dye. The seller was unable to obtain the raw materials for the dye 
anywhere other than in Germany, and the export restrictions on such materials were 
tightened in a matter of weeks. The defence of excusable impossibility was rejected by the 
court by simply arguing that a debtor who assumes a duty to deliver certain goods must 
assure himself of the availability of such goods.48 In Aktien Gesellschaft Mechanische 
Weberei v De Vries, a Dutch seller promised to deliver fabric for the manufacture of 
bandages under the guarantee of ‘export allowed’ to a German buyer. However, the export 
of the goods was unexpectedly prohibited by the authorities and the seller alleged that the 
prohibition had come as a surprise. The court held, however, that since export prohibitions 
                                                 
45
 Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 9 October 1919, NJ 1920, 249 (Simon v Holst). Cf Gerechtshof Arnhem, 15 June 
1920, NJ 1920, 1068. Note the similarities and differences in approach with Blackburn Bobbin Co Ltd v TW Allen 
and Sons Ltd [1918] 1 KB 540 (KBD), discussed by MacMillan in this issue.  
46
 Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 30 April 1919, W 1920, no 10588, 3 (Handelsvennootschap onder de firma Roskopf 
en Schoemaker v De Korver). Cf Gerechtshof Arnhem, 28 March 1923, W 1923, no 11052, 2 (Schut v 
Kempeneers); Gerechtshof’s-Gravenhage, 11 November 1929, W 1929, no 12056, 3 (Boichel v NV 
Amsterdamsche Ballast Mij). See also Rechtbank Amsterdam, 1 June 1923, W 1923, no 11222, 2, where a Dutch 
seller was unable to deliver iron wire because he could not reach his German supplier as a consequence of the 
occupation of the Ruhr (January 1923–August 1925). The court held that the seller was in breach of his duties 
under the contract since the contract did not stipulate that the wire had to be of German origin. 
47
 Rechtbank Den Bosch, 24 June 1921, W 1922, no 10919, 3 (Hildebrand v Klapwijk). 
48
 Rechtbank Amsterdam, 14 April 1916, W 1917, no 10087, 2 (Keller (London) v Firma Oosterveld en Romijn 
(Zaandam, the Netherlands)). In a similar vein, Rechtbank Zwolle 19 December 1917, NJ 1918, 174 (Van Kuyk v 
firma De Vogel van Calcar & Co). 
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were introduced frequently and changed often, the seller could not be excused by reference 
to the unexpected prohibition.49 
Assumption of Risk and Foreseeable Obstacles  
Where agreements had been entered into at a point in the war when parties had to reckon 
with further deterioration of market conditions, courts usually found that such future 
obstacles had been foreseeable at the time of conclusion of the contract. The legal reasoning 
applied in these cases typically was that a debtor who knowingly assumed certain 
obligations, cognisant of the fact that there was a war going on and of how the war had until 
then affected supplies, licensing and transport, voluntarily assumed the risk of further 
problems unless he explicitly excluded such risks.50 Moreover, when reviewing the court 
decisions on war conditions and vis maior, it is striking to find so many cases in which a 
burgeoning concept of ‘assumption of risk’ by the debtor plays a pivotal role in the 
attribution of risk for impossibility.51 For instance, one court held that where a seller in 
wartime assumes an obligation under the explicit condition to deliver ‘with permission’ (ie, 
‘including export licence’), he has taken upon himself the risk of not obtaining the required 
export licence.52 The use of this concept of ‘voluntary assumption of a risk’ seems to have 
                                                 
49
 Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 16 January 1920, W 1920, no 10552, 2 (Aktien Gesellschaft Mechanische Weberei te 
Zittau v Firma SI de Vries te Amsterdam). 
50
 See eg Rechtbank Rotterdam, 16 December 1915, NJ 1916, 432 (Rohn v Handelsvennootschap onder de firma 
GJ Dekkers); Rechtbank Rotterdam, 1 February 1917, NJ 1918, 1031 (Tempelaars v firma Jos de Poorter); 
Rechtbank Den Haag, 20 April 1916, WPNR 1916, no 2423, 278 (Wijzenbeek v An Englishman); Rechtbank 
Amsterdam, 7 March 1917, NJ 1917, 809 (Handelsvennootschap onder firma Feldmann & Co v Firma Van Cleeff 
Hessian Cy); Gerechtshof Arnhem, 27 March 1917, NJ 1917, 881 (Handelsvennootschap onder firma WA 
Gerritsen & Zn v graanhandelaar Reijers); Rechtbank Utrecht, 18 April 1917, NJ 1917, 1059; Gerechtshof Den 
Haag, 26 June 1917, NJ 1917, 863 (Zwarts v Latenstein van Voorst); Rechtbank Amsterdam, 25 June 1917, NJ 
1917, 877 (NV Maatschappij voor Commissiehandel v Amsterdamsch Handelskantoor); Rechtbank Rotterdam, 7 
February 1918, NJ 1918, 1045 (Engelsche Vennootschap Van den Bergh Limited v Vennootschap Swift & 
Company); Rechtbank Amsterdam, 7 June 1918, NJ 1918, 853 (Duives v Handelsvennootschap onder firma Van 
Doel en Fray); Rechtbank Breda, 25 June 1918, NJ 1919, 52 (Van Berkel v handelsvennootschap onder firma PW 
van Lisdonk & Co); Gerechtshof Den Haag, 28 June 1918, NJ 1918, 1028; Gerechtshof Den Bosch, 15 February 
1921, NJ 1921, 700, W 1921, no 10707, 3 (Handelsvennootschap onder de firma Wed A Maassen (Liege) v A 
Knols (Maastricht)); Gerechtshof Arnhem, 20 July 1922, W 1923, no 10972, 1 (Van Meerveld v NV 
Stoomvaartmaatschappij ‘Princenhage’). 
51
 Rechtbank Rotterdam, 5 October 1916, NJ 1917, 883 (Van der Graaf v Beukers cacaofabrikant); Gerechtshof 
Den Bosch, 25 September 1917, NJ 1918, 356 (Völker v Handelsvennootschap de Clever Pflanzer-butterfabrik); 
Rechtbank Haarlem, 6 November 1917, NJ 1918, 176, confirmed by Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 26 May 1919, NJ 
1920, 212 (Zaman v NV Haarlemsche Stoomzeepfabriek ‘Het Klaverblad’); Rechtbank Maastricht, 21 February 
1918 NJ 1918, 407 (Gebroeders van A v JA); Rechtbank Amsterdam, 31 May 1918, NJ 1918, 857 (Mari v 
Wijzenbeek); Rechtbank Den Bosch, 20 December 1918, NJ 1919, 635 (Firma Jos Bots v Walter); Rechtbank 
Haarlem, 13 May 1919, NJ 1919, 700 (Stein Hirsch & Co te New York v NV Haarlemsche Stoomverffabriek 
voorheen W Leur & Co ). 
52
 Rechtbank Amsterdam, 18 October 1918, NJ 1919, 55 (handelsvennootschap onder firma Behrendt en 
Bodenheimer (Hamburg) v Henniès); Rechtbank Dordrecht, 23 April 1919, NJ 1919, 612 (Vetter v Drinkwaard). 
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tacitly extended the basis for contractual liability from a mere fault basis to a broader risk 
basis.  
In a minority of cases, impossibility of performance was considered unforeseeable at the 
time of entry into contract.53 These cases generally contained an element of long-term 
commitment.54 For instance, in Kroon v Nord Thomson, the court had to consider a five-year 
contract agreed in August 1914 for the delivery of pudding sachets. By 1917, the delivery of 
pudding concentrates became impossible due to government restrictions. The buyer argued 
that the seller had assumed the risk of war conditions since he entered into the contract 
when war had already broken out. The court found, however, that the parties could not 
have contemplated in August 1914 that the war would continue for so long. Given that this 
was a contract for supply of goods manufactured by the seller himself, that no one could 
have foreseen the duration of the war, and in light of the import restrictions, the imposed 
distribution measures and the impossibility for the manufacturer to continue his business 
without interruption, the vis maior defence was sustained.55  
4 FROM SUBJECTIVE IMPOSSIBILITY TO UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES 
A Shift in the Legal Debate 
The outbreak of the Great War fuelled a particular legal debate which had been smouldering 
for some time since the early 1900s, namely whether the concept of impossibility included 
both factual (objective) and personal (subjective) impossibility. The latter concept was 
potentially more debtor-friendly and implied that the debtor was excused for non-
performance if he had done everything reasonably within his powers to perform the 
contract but failed due to externalities for which he bore no responsibility. Coincidentally, 
the 1914 annual meeting of the Dutch Lawyers Association (Nederlandsche 
Juristenvereeniging, NJV) had been devoted to the legal consequences of employee strikes 
and industrial action. With regard to interference with performance of contracts, the 
majority of members voted in favour of a rule allowing a debtor to invoke the ‘subjective 
force majeure doctrine’.56  
                                                 
53
 Gerechtshof Arnhem, 25 March 1919, NJ 1919, 535 (Vd Werff en Geldersche Credietvereeniging Arnhem v 
Zweedsche Vennootschap Rederi Aktiebolaget Moeller & Persson te Stockholm); Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 17 
March 1922, W 1923, no 10992, 4. 
54
 See eg Rechtbank Amsterdam, 21 February 1922, W 1922, no 10931, 3 (Firma Niehues & Dütting v Van 
Kempen), holding that when entering into contract in August 1915, it was not foreseeable that the USA would 
join the war. 
55
 Rechtbank Amsterdam, 27 February 1920, NJ 1920, 914 (Firma G Kroon & Co v Nord Thomson exploitant van 
Nederlandsche Chemische Fabriek). 
56
 See Scholten (n 43) 418. The ‘subjective force majeure doctrine’ was introduced in Dutch legal writing by JF 
Houwing, ‘Overmacht of onmogelijkheid’ [1904] Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn 250, 297. Cf Rutten (n 27) 247 ff. 
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Some authors came to the conclusion that the war showed that the juxtaposition of 
objective and subjective impossibility was untenable, since possibility in commercial 
contracts (eg, for fungible goods) usually hinges on the extent of the debtor’s willingness to 
dedicate resources to materialisation of the performance.57 Case law seemed to adhere to 
the subjective impossibility doctrine.58 The problem with this doctrine was that it did not 
offer a satisfactory explanation for the fact that impecuniosity did not constitute vis maior, 
that the debtor in a contract usually commits himself to a certain result (eg, the promise to 
deliver) and that foreseeable impossibility did not excuse the debtor.  
It was only shortly after the Great War that the debate became more pronounced.59 In his 
1919 doctoral thesis, JLL Wery explored the legal foundations for contractual liability and the 
basis of vis maior. He argued that, besides fault as a basis for ascribing responsibility for non-
performance, contractual risk was the proper basis for assigning responsibility. Therefore, 
personal conditions and circumstances could hardly ever constitute vis maior.60 In Wery’s 
approach, emphasis was placed less on the distinction between possible and impossible 
(factual and legal) and more on the imputability of non-performance as such. It is posited 
here that the typology of war cases thus helped to shift the scholarly debate from semantics 
on what constitutes ‘impossibility’ to the openly normative approach of assignation of 
contractual responsibility. Such an open approach also offered a perspective for the 
introduction of a statutory provision on unforeseen circumstances. At the time, the Dutch 
Civil Code did not contain a specific provision concerning unforeseen circumstances, that is, 
the situation where due to some extraordinary unforeseen event after the conclusion of the 
contract performance is rendered far more onerous for at least one of the parties than 
anticipated. The shift to the openly normative approach of assignation of contractual 
responsibility made the introduction of such a provision come within reach. The 1923 
doctoral thesis by Levenbach, which will be dealt with shortly, laid the foundations for a 
proper doctrinal discourse on exactly that issue. 
For this to happen, however, the judiciary first had to warm to the idea that the ‘good faith 
principle’ encapsulated in Article 1374 DCC could be used to vary obligations in view of 
                                                 
57
 HMA Schadee, Overmacht (WL & J Brusse’s Uitgeversmaatij, 1915) 7. 
58
 See Molengraaff (n 44) 12; EM Meijers, Behoort verandering in de feitelijke omstandigheden, waaronder een 
overeenkomst is gesloten, invloed te hebben op haar voortbestaan? Zoo ja, welke wettelijke regeling is te dien 
aanzien wenschelijk? (Preadvies Nederlandsche Juristen-Vereeniging 1918) (FJ Belinfante, 1918) 135 ff; MG 
Levenbach, Iets over de spanning van de kontraktsband bij verandering in de omstandigheden (diss Amsterdam) 
(HJ Paris, 1923) 12 ff. 
59
 S Royer, ‘Pacta sunt servanda en de verandering van omstandigheden in het privaatrecht’ [1972] RM Themis 
514, 522 ff. 
60
 See Wery (n 39) 1 ff. Cf the book review S Van Brakel, ‘JLL Wery, Overmacht bij overeenkomsten, Akad. Prft. 
Leiden, 1919—140 blz’ [1920] Weekblad van het Regt 3, 3; G Kirberger, ‘Overmacht bij Overeenkomsten (JLL 
Wery Akad Prft Leiden, 1919)’ [1920] Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn 159. 
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hardship.61 The question that divided opinion was whether the good faith principle merely 
related to the construction of agreed contractual obligations (spirit of the contract trumps 
the literal wording) or could also serve as a normative principle shaping the content of a 
contract. Although Article 1374 DCC contained a principle of good faith, at the time of the 
war it was applied rather restrictively.62 The Great War itself prompted the doctrinal debate 
on whether good faith could restrain or vary the obligations originally assumed by the 
parties. Until then, in case law the focus had been on impossibility and force majeure 
doctrines. After 1919, the emphasis in the lower courts slowly shifted to the good faith 
doctrine.63  
Although in hindsight the Great War may indeed have had the function of ‘warming’ the 
courts to a comprehensive theory of ‘good faith’ in contract law, it did not appear to have 
done so at the time. Even as late as the 1920s, the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad der 
Nederlanden) attached more value to strict compliance with what was agreed than to what 
good faith might require from the parties in view of later events. In two landmark cases 
dating from 1926, the Supreme Court stuck to its guns and ruled that the ‘good faith 
principle in the Civil Code does not authorise the court to amend, change, vary or neglect the 
essence of a contract in light of a change of circumstances’.64 Both cases dealt with the 
problem of drastic changes to the price of raw materials and supplies during and after the 
war, which caused hardship for the contracting party that had undertaken to deliver at a 
price fixed in accordance with earlier price levels. The Supreme Court essentially ruled that 
the price agreed could not be amended or adjusted on the basis of the ‘good faith’ principle.  
These decisions met with scholarly hostility at the time. They proved ultimately untenable. 
Although the Supreme Court did in fact accept good faith as a principle of contract law in the 
1920s, its scope remained limited and the court continued to resist attempts to amend or 
vary contracts on grounds of unforeseen circumstances until 1977.65 
Obviously, this is an ex post analysis of the contemporary debate. It took several more 
decades and the initiation of the restatement project of the New Dutch Civil Code after the 
Second World War for this debate to fully develop. It is argued here, however, that at the 
                                                 
61
 Art 1374 DCC provided: ‘All legally made agreements bind those who entered into them as laws. They cannot 
be rescinded other than by mutual consent or by reasons deemed sufficient by statute. They shall be 
performed in good faith.’ 
62
 S Van Brakel, Leerboek van het Nederlandse Verbintenissenrecht, eerste deel (WEJ Tjeenk Willink, 1948) 466; 
Abas (n 39) 109, 126. 
63
 See the overview by Abas (n 39) 110. 
64
 HR, 18 January 1926, NJ 1926, 203, WPNR 1926, no 2945, 270 (Stork v NV Haarlemsche Katoenmaatschappij 
(Sarong)); HR, 19 March 1926, NJ 1926, 441 (NV Textielfabriek ‘Holland’ v NV Tattersall & Holdworth 
Machinefabrieken en Magazijnen ‘De Globe’ & de Engelsche Vennootschap van Koophandel Butterworth & 
Dickinson Ltd te Burnley, England). Cf HR, 9 February 1923, NJ 1923, 676, ruling that the good faith principle 
was predicated on the assumed will of the parties rather than some external normative yardstick. 
65
 HR, 16 December 1977, NJ 1978, no 156 (Algemeen Ziekenfonds DPZ v X); HR, 27 April 1984, NJ 1984, no 679 
(NVB v Helder).  
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time of the Great War, there were early signs indicating that a shift in emphasis was on its 
way.  
Early Signs of Later Developments 
Although the Supreme Court resisted adjusting existing contractual rights, in the lower 
courts as well as in academic writing there were voices in favour of the acceptance of 
‘subjective impossibility’ due to war conditions as a category of excusable non-performance. 
As mentioned above, in principle the debtor bore the risk of fluctuations in the cost of 
obtaining the (raw) materials needed to fulfil his obligation (unless a price variation clause 
was agreed).66 Lower court decisions during the war meandered; sometimes it was held that 
a price increase of 20–25 per cent was sufficient to argue vis maior,67 in others price 
increases of 25 per cent or even over 60 per cent did not justify the vis maior excuse.68 If, 
however, according to eminent scholars such as Meijers and Scholten, the fluctuation was of 
a systemic nature and threatened the livelihood of an entire class of debtors, legislative or 
judicial intervention was considered appropriate.69 In hindsight, the 1918 proceedings of the 
Dutch Lawyers’ Association NJV sowed a seed that was to germinate at a later point in time. 
There Meijers presented his ideas on unforeseen circumstances. He later went on to extend 
these ideas, influenced by the German judicial approach to the 1920s devaluation crisis, into 
a draft for the new Dutch Civil Code.70 In turn, this draft influenced later Supreme Court 
decisions and thus marked the turning point for Dutch law.71 
The other sign was the acceptance, at least by the legislature, that inability to pay can 
sometimes constitute excusable non-performance. Under peacetime conditions, debtors 
who owed a money debt could normally not argue impecuniosity as grounds for non-
performance. As long as there was money there was a possibility to pay, irrespective of 
whether the debtor actually had any money.72 War, however, may cause money to 
                                                 
66
 LE Visser, Behooren ten aanzien van de gehoudenheid tot nakoming eener verbintenis bijzondere regelen te 
gelden met betrekking tot werkstaking, en zoo ja, welke? (preadvies NJV) (Handelingen der Nederlandsche 
Juristen-Vereeniging, FJ Belinfante, 1914) 6 ff; Meijers (n 58) 175 ff; Wery (n 39) 131 ff. 
67
 Rechtbank Den Bosch, 26 March 1915, NJ 1916, 439 (Firma H Van Roosmalen en Zoon v Firma Chr Fles); 
Gerechtshof Den Haag, 8 December 1916, W 10129 (Engel v Coöperative Inkoopsvereeniging van Roomsch 
Katholieke brood-, koek- en banketbakkerspatroons St Hubertus). 
68
 Rechtbank Den Bosch, 26 March 1915, NJ 1916, 439 (Firma H Van Roosmalen en Zoon v Firma Chr Fles); 
Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 2 March 1917, W 10140 (NV Rhurorter Oelfabrik te Amsterdam v Habermehl te 
Nieuwveen).  
69
 Meijers (n 58) 177; Scholten (n 43) 420; cf P Scholten, Verzamelde Geschriften (WEJ Tjeenk Willink, 1949) 40 
ff. 
70
 See CJ Van Zeben, JW Du Pon and MM Olthof, Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk 
Wetboek; Boek 6: Algemeen gedeelte van het verbintenissenrecht (Kluwer, 1981) 966 ff. 
71
 HR, 16 December 1977, NJ 1978, no 156 (Algemeen Ziekenfonds DPZ v X); HR, 27 April 1984, NJ 1984, no 679 
(NVB v Helder). 
72
 Rechtbank Almelo, 5 January 1916, NJ 1916, 1162 (Koudijs v Plaggemars). 
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disappear, either factually or legally.73 As mentioned, the outbreak of the Great War brought 
the European money markets to a sudden halt. Most governments grappled with the issue 
of whether or not to introduce dedicated statutory emergency powers to impose moratoria 
on creditors and thus create breathing space for debtors who found themselves with 
unexpected liquidity problems due to the collapse of international and national trade and 
banking and were unable to meet their debts as a result. The Dutch government decided to 
introduce rather limited emergency legislation following the acute liquidity problems for 
some debtors. The resulting 1914 Postponement Act was not a proper moratorium affecting 
all contract debts.74 It merely allowed debtors who could substantiate that their inability to 
pay their pre-war debts was a consequence of war conditions to petition the court for a 
(renewable) six month moratorium.75 Likewise, debtors could petition for postponement of 
bankruptcy or attachment of assets. Interestingly, there are hardly any published court 
decisions in which the 1914 Act was invoked. This might in fact mean that the mere 
existence of the Act already made creditors more willing to voluntarily grant their debtors 
more time to perform. If that is indeed what happened, then the 1914 legislative 
intervention was an efficient instrument to tackle these unforeseen events. Although 
prompted by the emergency of the outbreak of war, the underlying rationale for such 
legislative intervention remained popular throughout the twentieth century. Arguably, this 
type of intervention made the concept of adjustment of existing contractual rights for 
reasons of change of circumstances more acceptable than it had been previously.  
Resistance versus Responsiveness 
That said, shortly after the Great War, the legislature was not willing to intervene more than 
it had done so far. On the occasion of the 1918 annual conference of the Dutch Lawyers’ 
Association NJV, the members adopted the following resolution: ‘the legislature shall adopt 
measures to clarify the legal consequences of the current world war on currently existing 
contracts.’ The Ministry of Justice did not act on this resolution, much to the dismay of some 
lawyers who complained that practitioners needed guidance.76 Markets needed to sort 
themselves out in the post-war era.  
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 On money payments during the war, see Rechtbank Breda, 26 June 1917, NJ 1917, 810 (Gerhardus und Söhne 
AG v Dierckx); Rechtbank Middelburg, 9 January 1918, W 1918, no 10220; Rechtbank Winschoten, 5 June 1918, 
NJ 1918, 1001; Rechtbank Utrecht, 27 February 1918, NJ 1918, 1048 (NV Utrechtse Bank v Eppinghausen).  
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 ‘Uitwinningswet’ or ‘Uitstelwet’, Act of 4 September 1914, Staatsblad 444. On the deliberations surrounding 
the 1914 Postponement Act, see MWF Treub, Oorlogstijd Herinneringen en indrukken (HD Tjeenk Willink & 
Zoon, 1916) 258 ff.; IJ Brugmans, Paardenkracht en Mensenmacht (M Nijhoff, 1961), 435; Moeyes (n 1) 171.  
75
 Cf. N De Beneditty, ‘De Oorlog en de Huurovereenkomst’ [1915] Weeklad voor Privaatrecht, Notariaat en 
Registratie (WPNR) 513, 513, who argued that the Act was also applicable to tenancy contracts. 
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 Th A Fruin in W 1919, no 10485, 4; MH Bregstein, ‘Moet den rechter de bevoegdheid toekomen 
verbintenissen uit overeenkomst op bepaalde gronden zooals de goede trouw, te wijzigen? (Preadvies NJV 
1936)’ in Verzameld Werk (WEJ Tjeenk Willlink, 1960) 200–1. 
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It was not until the 1930s that the legislature embarked on a new wave of regulatory 
intervention in markets, mostly due to the disruptive economic crisis that emerged.77 By 
contrast, in the 1920s and 1930s there were few signs that the Dutch Supreme Court was 
willing to allow courts to amend, vary or discharge contract obligations with reference to 
‘good faith’ in view of unforeseen circumstances. In German and English law, at the moment 
of the outbreak of the Great War, the concept of frustration had already been developed, or 
at least discussed and contemplated.78 Dutch law did not have any such doctrine available at 
all, although some authors argued that the principle of contract performance in good faith 
could assume a comparable function.79 Although some supported the introduction of a 
statutory framework for dealing with material change of economic circumstances, post-
impossibility duties and amendment of existing contracts,80 no general legislative 
intervention to address the unforeseen shifts in the balance between debtors and creditors 
took place in the Netherlands.81 And, as mentioned, courts were mostly unwilling to 
intervene on their own account and the Supreme Court resisted calls for innovation.82 The 
Great War did, however, fuel the scholarly debate and the development of proper good faith 
theories for amendment and variation of contracts in cases of unforeseen circumstances. 
Moreover, the German 1920s devaluation of the Mark and the economic crisis of the 1930s 
prompted academics to take a less rigid approach to the subject.83 In 1931, however, the 
Dutch Supreme Court ruled that a money debt expressed in German currency was to be paid 
in nominal value and that unforeseen circumstances such as hyperinflation as such could not 
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 See Schuldbrievenwet 1934 (Debentures Act 1934), the Crisis-Hypotheekaflossingswet 1936 (Crisis Mortgage 
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authorise courts with reference to ‘good faith’ to increase money debts.84 In response to this 
decision, academics argued that courts should be authorised to amend contract debts in 
view of extraordinary currency changes.85 Others argued that the whole idea of international 
exchange rates is that they fluctuate and that, certainly in a national context, issues such as 
hyperinflation which are disruptive to society as a whole should be solved by comprehensive 
legislative rather than piecemeal judicial intervention.86 Lower courts did not always follow 
the Supreme Court’s conservative lead. Sometimes, they took a more responsive stance and 
they simply cloaked ‘unforeseen circumstances’ as impossibility.87 Some even openly 
accepted a doctrine of unforeseen circumstances.88  
5 THE NEUTRALITY OF CONTRACT LAW 
In some ways, one can consider Dutch contract law during the Great War in terms of its role 
as an instrument of neutrality. Earlier, we saw that the Dutch government made clever use 
of a purely self-regulatory contract scheme administrated by the NOT as a means of 
implementing the Dutch neutrality doctrine. It can be argued that the reticence of the Dutch 
courts to allow defences concerning ‘impossibility’ and vis maior may also be gauged in 
neutrality terms: whoever came to court, irrespective of nationality, would be held to 
perform in accordance with his promises. Consider, for instance, the effect of foreign 
nations’ restrictions on payments to enemies. Here, the Dutch courts applied a policy which 
was perfectly in line with the Dutch neutrality doctrine but which also killed any burgeoning 
concept of ‘good faith’ as an instrument of contract adaptation or variation. In one particular 
case, a German seller agreed in the spring of 1914 to deliver to an English buyer in the 
Rotterdam harbour payment against delivery.89 However, when the seller delivered shortly 
after the outbreak of the war, the buyer refused to pay. He argued that the English Trading 
with the Enemy Proclamation no 2 (dated 9 September 1914) rendered payment impossible 
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for him—he would face the risk of prosecution in England if he were to pay. The Dutch 
Supreme Court held: 
 
[Considering] that the respondent [ie, the claimant at first instance, WvB] has requested an 
injunction for performance of a contract, which was to be executed in the Netherlands and 
governed by Dutch law, while the claimant, who relies on force majeure obstructing 
performance of her obligations in this country, as such exclusively relies on a prohibition laid 
down in English law, basing her defence on a moral duty which is said to compel her to obey 
that prohibition and on the unpleasant consequences she fears the non-compliance with that 
prohibition will have for her; 
C[onsidering] however that the provision of a foreign statute shall not impede justice from 
running its course in this country, and that reference to the consequences in order to escape 
compliance with a legal duty by a party who knew this duty was subject to Dutch law in all its 
consequences, is without effect …90 
 
Thus, the judicial application of contract law during and after the Great War converged with 
the Dutch neutrality doctrine. So, when in 1931 the Dutch Supreme Court ruled that the 
nominalism principle remained applicable to money debts expressed in German currency 
and that unforeseen circumstances such as German hyperinflation did not authorise Dutch 
courts to amend claims with reference to ‘good faith’,91 it may have done more than just 
display a conservative and non-interventionist judicial stance. Indeed, one could speculate 
that the ramifications for the Dutch neutrality doctrine themselves may have made Dutch 
courts reluctant to intervene in contracts for reasons of ‘unforeseen circumstances’.  
6 FINAL REFLECTIONS 
In Europe, the Great War ended the long nineteenth century of laissez faire economic 
policies.92 In the Netherlands as elsewhere, the War necessitated government interventions 
in various markets and this heralded a new era of regulatory involvement in the fair 
operation of markets. Having witnessed the chaos, uncertainty, shortages, suffering and 
upheaval caused by the war, the Dutch legislature would never return to the pre-war state 
of liberal economic thinking.93 As such, this indubitably meant that private law doctrines, 
notably freedom of contract, were to play a different and less pronounced role in certain 
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markets.94 But did the war also lead to significant changes in the substance of private law 
doctrines? The answer to that question is less straightforward. Change in private law is 
difficult to measure, especially if such change is considered to be brought about 
incrementally by cases and court decisions. Moreover, any claim of causality between legal 
change and historical and social phenomena needs to be made with the utmost caution.95 
Therefore, I have not made a case for conceptualising the Great War as the turning point in 
the recent history of Dutch contract law. What I have shown, however, is that the Great War 
was the first intensive test of the contract law framework of the 1838 Civil Code. To my 
mind, this test showed that the conceptual structure of impossibility and vis maior was 
flawed: the judicial application of these concepts brought to light the fact that impossibility 
is not identical to vis maior, nor is it a necessary condition for vis maior. Thus, the courts felt 
compelled to bend these two statutory concepts to evaluate subjective impossibility as a 
potential excuse for non-performance. The war conditions also showed that the courts were 
extremely unwilling to let debtors off the hook easily, that the vis maior defence was more 
often rejected than sustained, and that the Supreme Court long resisted attempts to 
jeopardise the ‘neutrality of private law’. In this sense, the Dutch courts were predictable 
and firm enforcers of promises. Interestingly enough, they were also trying, or so it appears, 
to emulate the Dutch neutrality doctrine through their contract law decisions.  
In terms of the marks left by the Great War on Dutch legal scholarship, two influential post-
war monographs stand out. Wery’s book on vis maior benefited from pre-war work by 
others but it offered an outline for the future development of ‘imputable and non-imputable 
non-performance’ as an alternative model for dealing with vis maior. As such, it signified a 
move away from the malleable concept of ‘impossibility’ towards a more transparent 
approach of assigning responsibility. The 1923 monograph by Levenbach on the disruption of 
the contractual synallagma fuelled the debate on unforeseen circumstances as a separate 
doctrine of contract law.96 Although the Supreme Court was late in acknowledging good 
faith as the engine for the introduction of such an innovation in contract law, it was clear 
after the Great War that several lower courts and academics were convinced that this was 
indeed the right path. It was not until well after the Second World War that the Supreme 
Court proved them right. 
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